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For much of the past decade, Canada has been deeply engaged in the effort to remake Haiti’s police
forces in the image of a modern, democratic police service.  As part of successive United Nations police
support missions, upwards of 700 Canadian police officers served in Haiti during this period, mentoring
and training their local counterparts and carrying out some law enforcement responsibilities.  Haiti’s
recent descent back into chaos and lawlessness following the flight of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide,
however, has left this process, as well as the broader international effort to stabilize the hemisphere’s
most volatile and strife-ridden state, in ruins.  Once again, the outside world – while hardly innocent in
Haiti’s most recent bout of instability – finds itself struggling to restore order, security, and some
measure of democracy to Haiti.  And once again, Canada is part of a longer-term international effort to
transform Haiti’s police, which had become increasingly corrupt, politicized, and thuggish, into a force
for peace, order, and stability. While seemingly a Sisyphean task, the stakes surrounding police reform in
Haiti are particularly high.  With the disbanding of the Haitian military in 1994, the Haitian National
Police now stands as the country’s key security sector institution, and the most visible means through
which the Haitian state has attempted to exercise its legitimate authority.  For the international
community, failing to get it right this time may simply set the stage for Haiti’s next round of turmoil.
Haiti’s recurring nightmare dramatically illustrates the importance of addressing questions of
security sector reform in weak, unstable, or post-conflict states, and underlines the direct links between
an ineffective security sector and human insecurity.  A relatively recent addition to the international
relations lexicon, the notion of security sector reform refers to efforts to strengthen the full range of tools
at the disposal of states – from armies and police to courts, penal institutions, and intelligence services –
with which to exercise their monopoly on the legitimate use of force.  At its core, security sector reform
is based on the principle that a state’s security institutions should be democratically controlled, anchored
in the rule of law, and most importantly, sources of security rather than insecurity for citizens. 
This paper examines Canadian experiences, policies, and practices with regard to police reform –
a key element of the security sector reform agenda – in post-conflict or failed states.  While an entire
mythology has developed around Canada’s role as originator and long-standing champion of
peacekeeping in its military guise, less attention has been paid to policing as the second core pillar of
security in transitions from conflict to peace.  This is gradually changing, as the limitations of military
peacekeepers as agents of peacebuilding become more evident, and as it is increasingly recognized that
building sustainable peace in the absence of minimal levels of public security is next to impossible.  
In many ways, post-conflict police assistance – including the provision of international civilian
police for monitoring or law enforcement roles as well as longer-term training and institutional
development assistance – is an issue tailor-made for Canadian foreign policy, combining national
commitments to human security, to peacebuilding, and to the export of core Canadian values such as
peace, order, and good government.  However, while Canada’s contributions in this area to date are far
from negligible, neither has it been an international leader.  The paper will assess Canada’s contributions,
and the possibilities for greater Canadian involvement, in this area.  It will consider both domestic and
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international obstacles to a greater Canadian role – such as chronic personnel shortages,
interdepartmental politics, and the hodgepodge of inadequately coordinated institutional actors already
active in the field – and examine ways in which some of these challenges might be overcome.
Policing Post-Conflict Zones: The Evolving International Context
While it is now widely recognized that most contemporary conflicts occur within states rather than
between them, the international community is only slowly coming to terms with this new reality in terms
of its conflict management toolkit.  In the early 1990s, Bosnia in particular demonstrated the inadequacy
of conventional peacekeeping in the face of unconventional ethnic conflict, in which there were few
clearly-demarcated front lines, little distinction between combatants and civilians, and precious little
peace to keep.  At the same time, it has become evident that post-conflict peacebuilding in divided
societies is less about separating opposing armed forces and more about a sustained process of state-
building.  If state-building equals peacebuilding in the contemporary era, then the most that outside
military forces can contribute to this effort is to create a reasonably stable environment in which the
state-building process – which involves not only establishing sustainable institutions but also generating
domestic confidence in them – can occur.
Given the violent context from which post-conflict states struggle to emerge, it seems
uncontroversial to suggest that among the most important institutions to be re-constructed as part of the
peacebuilding process are those related to security.  Clearly, if the citizens of war-torn states cannot rely
on state institutions to provide for their security, they will have little incentive to either put down their
arms or abandon ‘their’ side of the armed struggle.  As Annika Hansen has suggested, “security is the key
to a “new social contract” between the population and its government or society in which the population
is willing to surrender the responsibility for its physical safety into government hands.”1 It is here, then,
that security sector reform and peacebuilding intersect, with success in the former realm a key
contributing factor in the success of the overall peace process.
Particularly in cases of intra-state conflict, recent experience underlines the fact that those
internal security sector institutions underpinning the rule of law are just as important as military
institutions in the transition from war to peace.  A key task of international peacekeeping efforts has been
to isolate, contain, and remove domestic military forces from the political process, and ultimately re-
direct their energies towards external rather than internal security tasks.  Sustainable peace, however,
requires an equally concerted effort to establish internal security and the rule of law by strengthening,
professionalizing, and de-politicizing police, courts, and penal institutions.  
In fragile and highly-politicized post-conflict environments, none of these processes can be
expected to unfold quickly or easily.  Within the security sector, therefore, peacebuilding processes can
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 usually be understood as unfolding in two, often overlapping stages: the direct international provision of
security in the interim period before domestic institutions are up to taking on these tasks themselves, and
the necessarily longer-term processes of building capacity within domestic security institutions.
With a few prominent exceptions, however, the international community has been reluctant to
impose both military and public security in post-conflict environments, despite recognizing the
importance of each.  This reluctance has allowed significant post-conflict security gaps to emerge, with
predictably deleterious consequences for fragile peace processes. Typically, security responsibilities in
post-conflict environments are divided among military peacekeepers, local police, and international
civilian police.  Just as typically, the former have been unwilling and unprepared to take on mundane
public security tasks, the latter have been under-powered and under-resourced, while local police
establishments are often as much a part of the problem as part of the solution.  More recently, and more
troublingly, post-conflict operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan have unfolded in the absence of an
active international civilian police presence.  This situation has left huge gaps in security provision
between international military forces, focused on force protection and terrorism interdiction, and local
police forces, which are hopelessly under-resourced and overwhelmed by the chaotic and lawless
conditions of the after-war period.  
The dangers of allowing post-conflict security gaps to persist in post-conflict environments are
many.  In this relatively lawless interregnum between war and peace, petty thieves, organized criminals
and remnants of ousted regimes may begin to regroup and assert themselves, ethnic or factional tensions
may boil over into open conflict, forms of retributive or vigilante justice may emerge, and there are real
risks of local communities turning against a peace process that appears incapable of delivering security. 
At the same time, international actors, in the face of persistent insecurity, may begin to lose both
credibility and resolve as time lines for achieving sustainable peace grow ever longer.  In the worst-case
scenario, any viable peace process is swamped by the combination of an increasingly criminalized
political economy, an untenable public security situation, and the re-emergence of ethnic or factional
conflict.  To greater or lesser degrees, all of these malign consequences have been evident in
peacebuilding processes in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Haiti.
To a large extent, militarized peacekeeping or peace-enforcement forces are incapable of
adequately addressing many of the public security challenges faced by post-conflict societies.  As
Charles Call and William Stanley have argued, “most militaries are not appropriate for public security
tasks, since their training, equipment, and doctrine emphasize use of overwhelming force rather than the
controlled application of force necessary for police work.”2 At the same time, soldiers are also reluctant
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agents of law enforcement, and most militaries tend to view public security work as thankless, dull, and a
misuse of valuable war-fighting capacity.
International civilian police missions, or CIVPOL in UN terminology, emerged at least partly in
response to the unmet security needs of post-conflict environments. With the exceptions of Kosovo and
East Timor, however, where international police were given executive law enforcement authority,
international police missions have typically been provided with weak mandates and inadequate resources
and asked to radically transform domestic security environments.  At the same time, the reputation of
international civilian police has not been helped by the UN’s inability to effectively manage international
police officers from dozens of member states representing an equal number of different policing cultures,
or to ensure that individual police monitors meet minimal requirements in terms of skills and
professionalism.  In terms of stature, organization, and resources then, the civilian policing component of
the international post-conflict security architecture is unquestionably the poor cousin of its more
celebrated military counterpart.
If anything, the difficult realities of contemporary post-conflict environments have made this gap
between international capacities in military security provision and public security provision that much
more apparent.  Notwithstanding the current turmoil in Iraq, militarized peacekeeping and peace-
enforcement missions have become relatively efficient at establishing a base level of military security in
post-conflict environments, especially when backed by the overwhelming military power of the United
States. The development of international capacities in the provision of post-conflict public security over
the past decade, on the other hand, has been somewhat haphazard and uneven.  Consequently, finding
ways to simultaneously stabilize the public security situation in strife-torn states, while at the same time
building up domestic law and order capacities, remains one of the international community’s key
peacebuilding challenges.
The Canadian Contribution: Past, Present, and Future
The Canadian police experience with modern peacekeeping began in 1989, when some 100 officers were
deployed to Namibia to help oversee transitional elections.  Canadian police officers have subsequently
been involved in many of the most prominent peace support missions of the past 15 years.  Yet while the
role of international police as an integral component of peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts has been
growing, Canadian commitments and capacities in this area have evolved only marginally.  While
Canadian police officers are, and continue to be, widely respected abroad for their professionalism,
Canada’s mechanisms for identifying, preparing, and deploying police officers for post-conflict work
continue to be largely ad hoc and provisional.  At the same time, over the course of the past half-decade
Canada has rarely managed to have more than 100 police officers deployed in peace operations at any
one time, despite widespread recognition among policy-makers that Canada could, and probably should,
be doing more.  While Canadian contributions are not markedly out of line with the contributions of
other Western states (even if well below the contributions of developing states such as Jordan), Canada is
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far from an international leader in contributing to multinational police support efforts.  Presently,
according to the UN’s most recent monthly statistics, Canada is contributing 45 civilian police to UN
peace operations, fewer than countries such as Fiji, Bulgaria, and Ghana.3 
Since 1997, the deployment of Canadian police personnel in international peace support
operations has been governed by the Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA), a funding and administrative
mechanism involving four major government actors: the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade (now Foreign Affairs Canada), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and the Department of the Solicitor General.  Foreign Affairs
provides the policy lead, CIDA provides the funding – some $19 million over three years under the
current agreement – while the RCMP provides the bulk of personnel.  In recent years, however, the
RCMP has developed partnerships with local and regional police forces across the country, which now
provide close to half of all officers for international missions.  Currently, the CPA provides sufficient
funding to enable some 42 Canadian police officers to be deployed internationally each year, although in
cases of larger deployments, CPA funding is topped up from other government sources.  The CPA does
not provide for a dedicated pool of officers on standby for international missions; rather it facilitates the
selection and deployment of officers on a case-by-case basis, primarily in response to requests from
multilateral organizations such as the UN.
While many of those familiar with the CPA insist that it has worked reasonably well over the
past seven years, there is also a widespread consensus that it is no longer adequate.4  Indeed, the CPA
was initially meant to be a temporary arrangement, put in place until a more permanent arrangement
could be developed and implemented.5  Now in its eighth year, however, the CPA appears increasingly to
be a permanent fixture of Canada’s foreign policy landscape.
Lying as it does at the intersection of foreign policy, international development, and policing, the
issue of Canadian support to post-conflict policing has been marked by divergent policy priorities among
the relevant participating departments.  While formally managed by an interdepartmental committee
representing Canada’s development, foreign affairs, and policing communities, the Canadian Police
Arrangement has never been firmly anchored in a coherent national strategic vision around Canada’s role
in post-conflict public security.  For its part, Foreign Affairs has led on the policy side, and has a clear
interest in an effective Canadian contribution to post-conflict policing as a means of enhancing Canada’s
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stature abroad and advancing its international policy goals, but lacks the financial clout to impose a clear
vision and direction.  Within CIDA, despite a growing recognition that police reform is a legitimate focus
for development assistance, police assistance issues have never been effectively integrated within the
agency’s broader development programs or strategies.6 
Limited resources and conflicting mandates have also generated considerable ambivalence
towards the issue of international and post-conflict police assistance within the RCMP.  On the one hand,
there is an awareness that Canada not only has a responsibility to contribute, as part of its broader
international commitments, to post-conflict stabilization efforts through police assistance, but that
Canada also benefits from such assistance.  Not only does it help prevent instability from entering
Canada in the form of refugee flows or cross-border crime, but participation in international policing
missions gives Canadian police personnel valuable experience.  On the other hand, the terms of the CPA
often force a trade-off between domestic and international policing.  Since the arrangement does not
allow the RCMP to hire additional policing resources, every police officer sent on an international
mission is one less police officer available for active duty at home.  This situation is hardly unique to
Canada, and is one of the key distinctions between military peacekeeping forces, who are essentially on
standby when stationed in their home countries, and “policekeepers,”7 who typically have ongoing
domestic law enforcement responsibilities.  In Canada, this reality has tempered the enthusiasm of senior
RCMP officials for international police work, since they tend to view such missions as at best a
distraction, and at worst an obstacle to the force’s ability to perform its core tasks at home.
The absence of a dedicated Canadian standby force of police personnel available for
international duty has had a number of implications for the practice of deploying Canadian police
officers abroad.  While Canada has committed itself to supplying UN police support missions with up to
50 officers on short notice, each request from the UN requires a relatively laborious process of
identifying potential candidates who are qualified, willing, and in a position to be released by their
superior officers.  This system, in addition to being relatively inefficient, also has implications in terms
of training for international service.  Since officers are not pre-selected, and since Canada aims to
provide personnel within eight weeks of an official request, the time frame between selection and
deployment provides little opportunity for training.  And while Canadian police personnel are widely
considered to be well-trained in modern policing methods, even the best-trained officers benefit from
additional training aimed at preparing them for the rigours of international police work in unstable post-
conflict societies.  Such supplementary training could include courses on international humanitarian law,
on dealing with refugee or displaced populations or with questions of disarmament or demobilization,
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and on the political dynamics of the specific country and conflict to which they are being deployed.8 
Issues of training and advance preparation are even more pressing given the relatively short rotations –
between six to twelve months – typical of international police missions.  All too often, by the time an
individual police monitor fully understands the local environment and is able to operate effectively
within it, he or she is being rotated back home again.  This revolving door approach to post-conflict
policing has eroded both the credibility and the effectiveness of UN police assistance missions.
At the same time, much as the Canadian Police Arrangement has suffered somewhat from being
owned by several departments and championed by none, there has been little effort to integrate post-
conflict policing issues with other elements of the security sector reform agenda, notably corrections or
judicial reform.  This issue is crucial, since perhaps the clearest lesson from international reform efforts
in the rule of law sector is that an effective police force means little if the local judiciary is corrupt or the
penal system dysfunctional.  In other words, there is a growing recognition that restoring the rule of law
in post-conflict states must be a single, integrated process.
At the moment, however, Canada’s capacity to deploy justice or penal reform experts into
international missions is even less developed than its ability to deploy police officers.  While Canadian
personnel in these areas have served in international missions, Canada’s approach is far from systematic,
and there has been little effort made to focus Canadian deployments in the areas of policing, justice, and
corrections into a coherent and integrated security sector reform strategy.9 Again, Canada is far from the
only country grappling with such issues, and both the United Kingdom and the United States may offer
some useful models for Canada as it contemplates future approaches in this area.  In 2001, for example,
the UK initiated a Global Conflict Prevention Pool, an exercise in ‘joined-up government’ aimed at
pooling resources and strategies from the UK Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, and the Department for International Development into a coherent national strategy for conflict
reduction.  The pool has enabled the participating departments to develop and implement joint strategies
geographically, as in Afghanistan or the Balkans, or thematically, as in the area of small arms and light
weapons.10 The United States has also acknowledged the inefficiencies of decentralized approaches to
security sector reform and post-conflict peacebuilding, and is working towards the establishment of an
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Office of Post-Conflict Stabilization in order to lend clearer focus and greater coherence to US
peacebuilding efforts.11 
Canada has neither the international clout nor the financial resources of its more powerful allies,
and thus might ultimately have to choose between either broadening or deepening its commitments to
international security sector reform.  Yet whether Canada chooses to develop coherent security sector
approaches to be applied in long-term engagements with countries such as Haiti, or strives to become an
international leader in the area of post-conflict police assistance, either would be a significant
improvement over the current state of affairs.  As it stands now, there is a real danger that Canada’s
commitment to engaged multilateralism in international peace and security issues is becoming more
legend than reality.
The Challenge of Multilateralism
Of course, given the previously mentioned problems with existing international mechanisms for the
provision of post-conflict police assistance, there are legitimate questions to be raised as to whether, and
why, Canada would want to funnel significant resources into a system that is highly inefficient, if not
wholly dysfunctional.  It is also the case that in the case of post-conflict policing, ineffective international
mechanisms regularly meet nearly intractable problems within post-conflict environments.  Post-conflict
police reform – as the Haiti case demonstrates with striking clarity – almost invariably involve
painstaking, long-term commitments, multiple and overlapping tasks and responsibilities, and uncertain
rewards in terms of concrete, measurable, and sustainable indicators of success.  Why, then, should we
bother?
With regard to the inherent difficulty and thanklessness of post-conflict policing, the short
answer is that simply avoiding the difficult problems will not make them go away.  As argued above, the
restoration of effective policing is now a crucial element of any peacebuilding process, and failure here
comes with a high risk of renewed conflict and instability.  And as James Traub has recently written in
the context of post-conflict nation-building more generally:
What is almost impossible turns out to be indispensable.  It has become obvious since
9/11 that we cannot allow collapsed states, or rogue states, to fester: their failures have
become our problem.  Nation-building is no longer a subject for debate: we will get it
right or pay the price.12
Concerning the well-publicized inefficiencies of UN peacekeeping missions, one possible option for
Canada could be to direct more of its international policing resources along bilateral channels.  Over the
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past several years, in fact, CIDA has funded numerous bilateral assistance projects, among them a
capacity-building project for the Afghan National Police and a multi-year project – carried out by the
Pearson Peacekeeping Centre – aimed at preparing military and police personnel from Francophone
Africa to participate in international peace support operations.  While such projects clearly make an
important contribution, within post-conflict situations donor-state bilateralism regularly exacerbates
problems of international coherence and coordination, problems which can dilute the impact of
individual projects.  For all its warts, and particularly within the context of immediate post-conflict
environments, the UN is often the only institution with the credibility, legitimacy, and ability to take on
the complex and long-term challenge of re-engineering domestic security institutions.  There is,
therefore, is a strong practical case to be made for Canada continuing to work within multilateral policing
frameworks, while at the same time pushing for improvements in the realm of policy and practice.
Indeed, given Canada’s past experience and its strong policing tradition, there is much that
Canada could contribute to a broader, long-term effort to enhance international and UN capacities in the
area of post-conflict police assistance.  Several key problems within the current UN approach to post-
conflict policing can be identified, and in each of these Canada could potentially contribute at least
partial solutions.
Personnel Training and Preparation: An oft-cited problem with international policing missions
is the rather uneven quality of personnel deployed to such missions.  Part of the problem is the UN’s
relatively underdeveloped capacities in the area of pre-deployment and continuing training for its mission
staff, which are exacerbated by the failure of countries, like Canada, to provide pre-deployment training
of any significance.  A second issue, far more sensitive because of its racial overtones, is the question of
the training and competence of international police officers from developing nations.  A near-universal
sentiment among Western police officers with experience in international missions is a sense of
frustration with counterparts from developing nations who show up in mission unable to drive, to speak
English, or perform basic policing duties in accordance with accepted international standards.13 To be
fair, the situation has improved over the past decade or so as UN standards have been gradually
tightened.  However, significant questions still remain, among both Western police officers and the
populations of post-conflict states, about the qualifications and credibility of officers from developing
countries – especially those with dubious human rights records – as trainers, mentors, and role models.
Regardless of the depths of the North-South divide in policing capacities, much more could be
done to prepare police officers from all nations for international missions.  Canada, for its part, has a
developing capacity in this area, which could feed into a broader international training regime for
international police work in post-conflict zones.  Organizations such as the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
and CANADEM, an Ottawa-based non-governmental organization which manages the deployment of
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Canadian civilians into international peace operations, are expanding their efforts in the area of
international police training, one element of which involves training police officers of other nations for
peace support work.  Building up a coherent Canadian capacity in this area, and coordinating this
capacity with similar efforts in other countries, could form the basis of an integrated training system for
international policekeepers. 
Strategic Planning and Development: At a recent Ottawa workshop examining Canadian and
international responses to the challenges of post-conflict policing, one consistent theme concerned the
lack of, and need for, coherent planning and development in international police support missions. 
Claude Rochon, a retired Canadian police officer with experience in missions all over the globe, noted
that missions in which strategic plans had been developed and implemented were very much the
exception rather than the rule.14 Such planning is crucial, however, both because of the inherent
complexity of police reform and because of the chaotic and fluid nature of most post-conflict
environments.  In Haiti, for example, a relatively comprehensive international effort to build up the
Haitian National Police (HNP) ultimately foundered on questions of professionalism and politicization,
as senior Haitian police managers not only failed to ensure accountability within the ranks but also failed
to resist politicization of the police apparatus as the country’s political crisis deepened.15 While police
reform in Haiti has in many ways been a victim of the country’s broader political crisis, the weaknesses
within the HNP that the crisis exposed suggest that greater attention needs to be paid to the quality of
police leadership, to questions of accountability up and down the police hierarchy, and to the links
between police reform and the broader peacebuilding process.
 Strategic planning is all the more important given the regular turnover of personnel in
international missions; setting goals, standards, policies and procedures that are clear, consistent and
transparent is crucial given endemic problems with personnel continuity, particularly within senior
management positions.  On top of all this, the multidimensional nature of modern police support
operations, which are often asked simultaneously to monitor and mentor local counterparts, recruit and
train a new generation of officers, weed out bad apples from existing staff rosters, and re-organize entire
national policing infrastructures, requires considerable planning to ensure that these various elements
work together as a coherent whole.  And while the UN’s Civilian Policing Division has been upgraded in
recent years, its strategic planning capacities remain largely inadequate in the face of such challenges.
While a country like Canada could not realistically be expected to tackle the challenge of mission
strategic planning on its own, there are elements of the broader set of issues with which Canada could
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usefully engage in an effort to move international planning capacities forward.  On its own or in
collaboration with like-minded states, Canada could usefully explore options for improving UN post-
conflict policing capacities in areas such as best practices and lessons learned, or in the development and
institutionalization of standard rules, policies and procedures for post-conflict policing operations.  Given
the legal vacuums that often exist in post-conflict environments, there has also been some discussion of
the need to develop a generic legal framework that could guide international police missions, particularly
in the early stages of a mission.  Canada could also explore the feasibility and desirability of developing
such a mechanism.
Standby and Rapid Reaction Capability: Since most police officers have ongoing law
enforcement responsibilities in their home countries, questions of availability and staffing have dogged
UN police support efforts for years.  The challenge of finding enough qualified staff for international
missions also, of course, has had implications for the quality of international personnel, as it has forced
the UN to focus on quantity over quality.  And while there is growing talk of the UN moving to leaner,
less personnel-intensive missions in the future, with the burden of law enforcement placed squarely on
the shoulders of domestic police within post-conflict states, this may ultimately prove to be wishful
thinking.  In other words, major police missions à la Kosovo, East Timor, or even Bosnia may not be
exceptions to the rule, but rather indicative of the range of post-conflict situations that will continue to
test international capacities to deliver post-conflict public security.  It may, therefore, not be so easy to
simply wish away questions of securing adequate personnel for international policing missions.
In recognition of such realities, the European Union has moved to create a standby force of 5,000
police officers available on short notice to respond to crisis situations.  As discussed in more detail
below, Canada could follow suit by improving its standby capacities through the creation of a standing
international police support unit, which could also serve as both model and inspiration for other states. 
At the same time, through CANPOL, a division of CANADEM that provides retired police officers for
international work, Canada already has a standing pool of experienced officers ready and willing to be
deployed on short notice.  Working with the UN to institutionalize the use of such personnel, and to
streamline procedures through which retired officers are incorporated into international missions, could
be another means by which the challenge of finding qualified and available policing personnel could be
overcome.
Coordination of Multilateral and Bilateral Efforts: Beyond getting the Canadian and UN houses
in order on the question of post-conflict policing, there is also the question of enhancing coordination
among the broader international community, including the range of bilateral and multilateral actors
involved in police reform in particular cases.  Across the security and development sectors, the question
of international coordination is a difficult one, and levels of coordination are often so poor as to render
nonsensical the very notion of an ‘international community.’  In many cases, the relevant actors
recognize that coordination should be improved, but feel powerless to make it happen.  In post-conflict
policing operations, the lack of overall donor coordination, combined with an absence of strategic
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planning and direction, often leads to inefficient and ineffective allocation of scarce resources.  In some
cases, local police forces receive computers when they really need pens and paper, or motorcycles when
then need flashlights.16
While acknowledging that coordination among a multiplicity of agencies in chaotic post-conflict
conditions will remain a considerable challenge, there are things that concerned countries such as Canada
could do to improve matters.  In the policing field, for example, Canada could seek to identify and
promote best practices in the area of international donor coordination.  One such example comes from
Albania, where an international consortium on law enforcement assistance has been relatively successful
in coordinating police assistance efforts across a range of relevant actors.  In this area as in others, there
is no guarantee that Canadian advocacy will be either heard or heeded.  What is certain, however, is that
effective police reform in post-conflict environments requires international resources and assets to be
used as efficiently as possible, and that the failure of contributing states to take this issue seriously will
perpetuate a situation in which disoriented and uncoordinated international responses to chaotic post-
conflict situations will produce unsatisfactory outcomes. 
Future Policy Directions
Canada is current engaged in a foreign policy review, and there is a compelling case to be made for a
review of Canadian policies concerning this country’s role in post-conflict policing.  As things currently
stand, four different options present themselves.
Business as usual: While this option requires no new resources, it leaves in place a policy tool
that does not deliver much bang for the buck.  It also leaves unaddressed the dissatisfactions of each of
the main government players with the current system and leaves Canada without a coherent mechanism
to deal with broader questions of security sector reform.  However, unless each of the departments
involved in the international police assistance file begin to make a clear and coherent case that this is an
area in which Canada should be playing a stronger role, this option is also the most likely.  From a
government decision-making perspective, status quo inertia is rendered more likely because post-conflict
police assistance does not enjoy the high profile that the deployment of military peacekeepers does. 
Conversely, however, the deployment of a handful of police officers to work in relative obscurity in
Baghdad or Pristina or Freetown allows Canada to claim that it is contributing to post-conflict public
security across the globe without a major commitment of money or personnel.
Greater use of retired officers: This option also entails minimal risk or commitment on the part
of the Canadian government.  CANPOL, the policing arm of CANADEM, currently has some 800 retired
Canadian police officers on its roster, most of whom have considerable international experience and
relatively few domestic encumbrances.  Indeed, retired officers are becoming a fixture of international
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police missions, even if they represent at best a partial solution to the deficiencies of current Canadian
and international systems.  On the one hand, the UN still prefers to recruit actively-serving officers,
partly because of age and fitness issues,17 but also because active officers tend to come seconded with
sponsoring-government salaries, and are thus less expensive.  On the other hand, Canadian policy-makers
themselves remain wary of an over-reliance on retired personnel, in part because retired officers are not
as accountable to their home governments and in part because they may not enjoy the same kind of
access to information or resources in the field as they would if they were full-time employees of their
home governments.18 At the same time, the use of retired officers in international missions has raised a
host of logistical questions, from issues of liability and insurance to more mundane questions of whether
retired RCMP officers working abroad should be allowed to wear RCMP uniforms and badges.  While
none of these challenges is insurmountable, combined they do suggest that while there is a role for retired
police officers in international police support missions, there are limits to how far the privatization of
police assistance services can be taken.
A broadened and/or deepened Canadian Police Arrangement: If Canada does want to take on a
more prominent role in the provision of post-conflict public security, one option would be simply to
direct more financial resources into the current CPA.  Given that overhead and administration costs are
relatively fixed, doubling the CPA operating budget to $12.6 million per year should allow Canada to
more than double its standing commitment to the United Nations.  The fact that different pots of
government monies are often drawn on to support larger deployments of Canadian police personnel also
means that this is not necessarily a question of finding new money, but rather of pooling existing funds.  
At the same time, or alternately, the current CPA could be transformed into a broader vehicle for
the delivery of Canadian expertise in the area of security sector reform. Much like the UK’s Global
Conflict Prevention Pool, such a transformation of the CPA would not only provide a framework for the
international deployment of Canadian personnel in the justice and penal sectors, but would also allow the
gradual development of a coherent Canadian approach to questions of security sector reform.  Moving in
this direction would also require a greater commitment to inter-departmental policy coordination, since
the CPA’s policy-level steering committee is currently required to meet no more than once a year.
The principal drawback of this option lies in the fact that, at least in the policing field, more
money will not necessarily fix the current flaws in the CPA.  In the absence of a sustained, long-term
funding commitment by its government partners, the RCMP still will not be in a position to hire
additional police officers to offset the greater numbers of its staff deployed internationally.  In this sense,
more money might simply add to the current headaches of the RCMP (and of other participating police
forces) in terms of having to identify, release, and cover for even greater numbers of field officers.  At
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the same time, while an expanded CPA might put greater numbers of Canadians into the field, it will not 
address existing tensions between adequate training and rapid deployment.  Finally, as with the previous
two options, neither a broadened nor a deepened CPA will facilitate a more robust Canadian contribution
to improving current deficiencies within the international system around post-conflict police assistance. 
A dedicated International Civilian Police Division: The most ambitious option for upgrading
Canadian capacities in the field of international police assistance – and the most logical if Canada is to
establish itself as a serious player in this area – is to establish a dedicated international police support
division within the RCMP.  While requiring a considerable and sustained financial commitment on the
part of the Government of Canada – in the neighborhood of $30-50 million annually19 – the creation of a
standing unit would give Canada significant capacity not only to provide officers for international
missions but also to engage seriously in international training and research.  Assuming that half of the
standing Canadian unit would be deployed abroad at any one time, this would still leave a substantial
number of personnel available to either receive, develop or deliver specialized training in international
police assistance, or to form the core of an Canadian policy unit on strengthening international capacities
in the area of post-conflict policing. 
The idea for a dedicated Canadian international civilian policing unit is not new, and the RCMP
has been advocating such a move for a number of years.20 From an RCMP perspective, the creation of an
international standby unit neatly overcomes the tensions between international and domestic policing
responsibilities, as the unit would be fully separated from the RCMP’s domestic policing arms, and stable
funding would enable additional hiring to fill gaps left by police officers drawn into the unit.  At the
same time, the formation of the unit would entail the automatic pre-selection of officers for overseas
deployments, enabling these officers to receive substantial pre-deployment training.
The creation of an international civilian policing unit would also require alterations to current
administrative arrangements.  Given the level of funding involved, funding for this new initiative should
come directly from the Treasury Board, rather than through CIDA.21 This would not only simplify
administrative arrangements, but shift CIDA – which has proven to be somewhat ambivalent in its
approach to the CPA – from the role of funder to the role of advisor.  An inter-departmental committee
could still be struck to manage overall policy direction for the new mechanism, and this committee could
form the nucleus for an integrated Canadian strategy on security sector reform issues.
Establishing a standing Canadian capacity for international police assistance would be a bold
step, and would send a strong signal that Canada is willing to put its money where its mouth is on
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questions of international peace and security.  As well, since police assistance is increasingly considered
part of official development assistance, it could also help bring Canada’s official aid levels back to
respectable levels.  Realistically, however, getting this issue on the government’s foreign policy agenda
will require a considerable lobbying effort from a range of directions, particularly given the relatively
low profile of post-conflict policing both within the Canadian public and within the Canadian
government.
Conclusion
In this paper I have made the case that questions of post-conflict public security are increasingly
recognized as essential to the success or failure of peacebuilding operations, and have argued that Canada
should seriously consider upgrading its capacities in this area as part of a renewed Canadian commitment
to engaged multilateralism.  Enhancing Canadian capacities for the provision of post-conflict police
assistance would not only be consistent with explicit Canadian foreign policy aims, it would also add
some needed balance between commitments and capabilities.  At the same time, Canada currently enjoys
a strong international reputation in the area of policing, and an equally strong – if slowly waning –
reputation in the field of international peacekeeping.  An expansion of Canadian capacities for post-
conflict police assistance would build on both these traditions, and re-assert Canada’s stance as a
champion of constructive solutions to international conflict.  On the financial side, while establishing a
permanent Canadian standby unit for international post-conflict policing would entail considerable
expansion of the monetary envelope currently devoted to such efforts, the required investment is not out
of line given Canada’s $3.1 billion aid budget, and given the widely-acknowledged links between
insecurity and underdevelopment.  If, as noted above, there can be no development without security, then
practically speaking an investment in public security is an investment in development.
More broadly, there is little question that expanding Canadian capacities for post-conflict
policing would help fill existing gaps within international capacities in this area.  Recent events in Haiti
suggest that the provision of post-conflict public security will continue to stress the resources of the
international community for many years to come.  Conversely, ongoing instability in both Iraq and
Afghanistan suggest that failing to respond to this challenge risks condemning post-conflict societies to
future cycles of strife, conflict, and misery.  By taking up its end of this challenge, Canada can not only
position itself as an international leader in this area and enhance its international reputation, it can also
make a concrete and long-lasting contribution to international stability.  
